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Abstract:  
This paper estimates the causal impact of party affiliation (Republican or Democrat) of 
U.S. governors on pollution. Using a regression discontinuity design, gubernatorial 
election data, and air quality data from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), we 
find that pollution is lower under Democratic governors. We identify that this is mostly 
due to environmental policies enacted by Democratic governors. 
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1 Introduction
It is estimated that more than 25 million Americans, including 7 million children, suffer
from asthma, and that that number has been steadily increasing since 2000 (Akinbami
et al., 2012). One important contributor to this increase is exposure to air pollution (e.g.
Pe´nard-Morand et al. (2010)). There is indeed a large body of literature on the negative
impacts of air pollution on health (e.g. Greenstone (2004), Chay & Greenstone (2005),
Dominici et al. (2014)). Although air pollution is strictly regulated in the U.S. under the
Clean Air Act, we observe substantial variability across states and such variation is likely
influenced by the states’ political environment (Potoski & Woods, 2002). In particular, the
identity of the party in power is likely to have a significant influence as it has been shown
to affect economic activity, policies, spending, and the labor market (e.g. Besley & Case
(1995, 2003), Leigh (2008) and Beland (2015)). Party affiliation is then likely to contribute
to the realized levels of air pollution.
In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of party affiliation (Democrat or Republi-
can) on the states’ levels of five major air pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ground-level
ozone (Ozone), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matters (Particulates)1 and sulfur diox-
ide (SO2). We find that the concentrations of nitrogen dioxide, ground-level Ozone and
particulate matters are significantly lower under Democratic governors. We find no influ-
ence of party affiliation on the levels of the other pollutants. Interestingly, we find that
changes in the levels mostly happen below EPA standards.
We further investigate the likely channels through which party affiliation affects the con-
centration of pollutants. Using dummy variables for major regulation changes for nitrogen
dioxide and sulfur dioxide, we argue that frequent changes in the regulation of nitrogen
dioxide explain a significant portion of our results. This is in agreement with Hansju¨rgens
(2011) who argues that regulatory uncertainty may have significant negative impacts on the
efficiency of NO2 and SO2 markets.
1Technical definition: PM10 Total 0-10um STP
1
This paper contributes to the growing literature linking politics and the environment
(e.g. Fredriksson & Neumayer (2013), Bianchini & Revelli (2013), Cremer et al. (2008)).
Our results complement the literature’s fndings that the election of Democratic (or left-
centrist, see Garmann (2014)) politicians have a positive impact on the environment. Fredriks-
son & Wollscheid (2010) find that party discipline, strength, and political instability are
strong determinants of policy outcomes, while List & Sturm (2006) argues that policies
are largely influenced by lobbying and finds a strong link between electoral incentives and
environmental policies. Innes & Mitra (2015) find that new Republican representatives
significantly depress inspection rates in the year following their election.
We contribute to this literature by estimating the causal impact of party affiliation
of U.S. governors on the actual levels of air pollutants. Our analysis suggests that party
affiliation has a significant impact on the quality of life as measured by the concentration of
air pollutants, and that this impact is mostly a result of policy choices. In addition to the
obvious health consequences, our focus on the actual environmental measures (as opposed
to environmental policies) is also motivated by the recent literature linking air quality to
happiness (Levinson, 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the data and
discuss historical trends and context. In section 3, we present our methodology. In section
4, we present our results. In section 5, we present robustness checks. We conclude in section
6.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data
The main data on air pollution come from the United States Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) AirData from 1975 to 2013. We use information on yearly average con-
centrations in a given state for five major pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ground-Level
ozone (Ozone), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter (Particulate) and sulfur dioxide
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(SO2). Concentration levels represent unweighed averages across the states’ monitoring
stations. Using the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, we also report the yearly
exceedance levels.2 Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
We use two main sources for the election data: ICPSR 7757 (1995) and Atlas of U.S.
Presidential Elections. The first source is available for data prior to 1990 and the second is
used for the years 1990 to 2013. We use two main pieces of information from these sources:
the party that is in power in year t and state s, and the margin of victory. For the purpose
of this study we only consider states where either a Democrat or a Republican won. The
margin of victory is calculated as the party of the winner minus the second candidate.
We set the margin of victory to be positive if the Democratic candidate won and negative
otherwise. The discontinuity is set at 0%. From 1975 to 2013, there are 1906 state-year
observations where either a Democratic or a Republican governor won. Over that period,
Democrats where in power 54% of the time.
2.2 Background Information and Historical Trends
We concentrate on five pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ground-Level ozone (Ozone),
nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter (Particulate) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). In this
section, we briefly describe each of these pollutants, their main effects on health, and their
historical trends.3
Three pollutants are directly emitted as a result of human activities: CO, NO2 and
SO2. Carbon monoxide is emitted mostly from combustion of mobile (cars, trucks, etc.)
sources and fires. It affects health mostly by reducing oxygen delivery to the organs and
tissues. Nitrogen dioxide is also produced as a result of combustion, principally from mobile
sources, fires, and industrial processes. Direct health effects of NO2 include inflammation of
the respiratory system and asthma. NO2 also contributes to the formation of ground-level
2We use primary standards, see http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html for a precise description of
those standards.
3Source: EPA, more information are available on EPA’s website. See http://www.epa.gov/airquality/.
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ozone, particulate pollution (see below), and acid rain. Sulfur dioxide is emitted from the
combustion of fossil fuels, mostly from power plants. SO2’s main direct effects on health
are also related to the respiratory system. SO2 also has indirect effects on health as it
contributes to the formation of particulate matter and acid rain.
The two remaining pollutants, ground-level ozone and particulate matters, are not di-
rectly emitted and are the result of the interactions between other pollutants. Ozone is
formed by the interaction between nitrite oxides (including NO2) and volatile organic com-
pounds (from organic chemicals, present in household products, paint, etc.). Ozone mostly
affects individuals with lung diseases. Children and the elderly are also particularly sensitive
to Ozone. Particulate matters represent a mixture of a large variety of chemicals, dust, and
acids. The effects of particulate matters on health are wide and depend on the size of the
particulates. Smaller particulates (on which this paper focusses) have the strongest impact
on health, contributing (among many others) to lung diseases, non-fatal heart attacks, and
asthma.
Over the years the concentrations of those five pollutants have been steadily decreasing
(see Figure 4). A likely contributor to that decrease is the Clean Air Act (established
in 1970 with major amendments in 1977 and 1990) which requires the EPA to establish
quality standards for six major pollutants (including the five pollutants studied here as well
as lead). Although states are required to adopt strategies in order to meet those quality
standards, implementation is highly heterogeneous across states and pollutants. We shall
see that this heterogeneity in implementation has a measurable impact on the concentration
levels, and can be (at least partly) explained by states’ political dynamics.
3 Methodology
We capture the causal impact of the party allegiance of governors on air quality using
a regression discontinuity design (RDD), following the work of Lee (2001, 2008). The
RDD allows us to remove the potential endogeneity of elections resulting from unmeasured
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characteristics of states and candidates. Our main specification uses parametric regression
discontinuity. We estimate the following equation:
Yst =β0 + β1Dst + F (MDVst) +Xst + γs + νt + st (1)
Yst represents the air quality measure of interest. We look at five different measures of air
quality: the average concentration of NO2, SO2, Particulates, Ozone and CO2. The main
coefficient of interest is β1. Dst is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a Democratic
governor is in power in state s during year t. Following Gelman & Imbens (2014), the pure
party effect, β1, is estimated by controlling for the margin of victory using a second-order
polynomial of the margin of victory: F (MDVst). MDVst refers to the margin of victory in
the most recent gubernatorial election prior to year t in state s. As an example, the party
of the winner of the 2004 gubernatorial election in Indiana and the margin of victory are
used in regressions for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 in that state. The margin of victory is
defined as the proportion of votes cast for the winner minus the proportion of votes cast
for the candidate who finished second. The value is positive if the Democratic candidate
won and negative if he or she lost. We exclude observations where neither a Democrat
nor a Republican won. γs captures state fixed effects and νt captures year fixed effects.
Xst refers to time-varying state characteristics used in some specifications. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level to account for potential serial correlation. We also present
alternate polynomials and local-linear regression in the section 5, using optimal bandwidth
choice by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012).
4 Results
4.1 Graphical Evidence
As is customary in RD analysis, we first present some graphical evidence on the impact of
Democratic governors on concentration levels for our outcomes of interest: carbon monoxide,
ground-level ozone, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. Figure I explore
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the discontinuity at 0% when a Democratic governor barely wins over a Republican.
In each graph, each dot represents the average outcome that follows election t, grouped
by margin of victory intervals. The solid curves in the figures represent the predicted values
from the quadratic polynomial fit without covariates. Figures for outcomes suggests that
concentration levels are lower under Democratic governors. In the next section, we estimate
these effects more precisely.
4.2 Main results
Table 2 presents RD estimates for outcome variables: concentrations of CO, Ozone, NO2,
Particulates, and SO2. The tables report only the coefficient of interest: β1, which cap-
tures the impact of the Democratic governor on the outcome variable of interest. Table 2
shows that Democratic governors significantly reduce concentrations for NO2, Ozone and
Particulates. Coefficients for CO and SO2 also suggest that Democratic governors reduce
concentrations, although the results are not statistically significant.
Table 3 investigate whether the concentrations of the substances are higher than rec-
ommended by EPA. Table 3 shows that under Democratic governors, it is less likely that
ozone emission will exceed the limits. There is no significant difference for the rest of the
substances (CO and particulate), and NO2 and SO2 never goes above the recommended
limit. In summary, Table 2 and 3 both suggest that concentrations are lower under Demo-
cratic governors, although only the ozone limit is less likely to be met under Democratic
governors.
Although Democratic governors mostly affect concentrations of pollutants for levels in
accordance with the EPA standards, the impacts on health may still be important. In
particular for Ozone and Particulates, the EPA standards are significantly weaker than
the guidelines suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO, see Table A.3). As
discussed in section 2.2, Ozone and Particulates are not directly emitted and are the result
of complex interactions between many pollutants. This implies that pollution reduction is
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more challenging for those pollutants, and that they are therefore more prone to political
manipulation (Potoski & Woods, 2002). In the next section, we discuss how this section’
results can be partly explained by state regulations.
4.3 The Impact of State Regulations
Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 investigate potential channels to explain the difference in
pollution under Democratic governors. We concentrate on two main channels: policies and
public spending on parks and recreation and natural resources.
We expect the main channel to be through changes in policies. According to Potoski &
Woods (2002), changes in Air pollution regulations are strongly influenced by the political
game, and by lobbies. By opposition, spending is more dependent on the complexity of the
environmental problem and mainly goes through bureaucracies, which are likely to be less
influenced by changes in the governor’s party affiliation.
As discussed in section 2.2, a likely contributor to the decrease in the measured con-
centrations of pollutants is the Clean Air Act, established in 1970 and revised in 1977 and
1990. State level implementations of the Clean Air Act differ substantially across states
(again, see section 2.2). We argue that those differences are, at least partly, sourced in the
political game between Democrats and Republicans.
We will focus on the trading systems for the nitrogen dioxide and the sulfur dioxide as
they are widely recognized to have significantly impacted the concentrations of those two
pollutants (Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009). Figures 5 and 6 present the differences in average
concentration levels for states participating or not in the trading programs.4 We see that,
for both pollutants, those trading programs have been implemented in states with relatively
high levels of pollutants. The impact, however, seems to be much stronger for SO2. One of
the possible explanations is that there were far fewer changes to the program’s regulation for
SO2 than for NO2. We include those changes as controls in our RD regressions. Specifically,
we add a dummy variable for the states involved in those trading programs as well as for
4Note that the trading program started in 1995 for SO2 and in 1990 for NO2.
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major changes in those programs.
Table 4 replicates the results of Table 2 while including additional controls for the
policies discussed above. The coefficient for Democratic governors is no longer significant,
which suggests that policies are a main channel through which we observe the decrease in
pollution under Democratic governors. This is in accordance with Ines and Mitra (2015).
Table 6 replicates the results of Table 2 and includes additional controls for spending
on parks and recreation and natural resources, but no policy controls. Results are similar
to Table 2 and show a significant decrease for ozone and particulates.5 Table 5 control for
policies and spending on parks and recreation and natural resources. Results are similar to
table 2 and not significant.
Table 4, 5 and 6 suggest that the main channel through which governors affect pollution
is the implemented policies. Although controlling for spending of parks and recreation and
natural resources adds noise to the estimates, the estimated coefficient is only marginaly
affected. By opposition, controlling for changes in policies have a strong downside impact
on the magnitude of the coefficient. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that
we found little impact of the political game on the probability that a state met the ex-
ceedance levels. Indeed, violation of the primary exceedance levels is small, and relatively
homogeneous across states and time. This suggests that the politico-environmental game
happens for relatively low levels of concentration, i.e. in accordance with federal regulation.
5 Robustness and Different samples
We investigate the validity of the RD methodology in our context. We first look at the
density of the elections around the cutoff. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the margin of
victory (MV) for Democrats across all elections in our sample. The distribution is clustered
around the cutoff point with no unusual jumps. Figure 3 presents the McCrary test. It
represents the density function of the margin of victory according to the procedure outlined
5The results for spending are similar to Fredricksson et al. (2010) who find no effect of party affiliation
on environmental spending.
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in McCrary (2008). We find no unusual jumps around the cutoff.6
Second, we investigate the robustness of the results to alternate polynomials. Following
Lee & Lemieux (2014), we verify that our results are similar using first and third degree
polynomials. Results presented in Table 8 and Table 9 show that results are quite similar
regardless of the order of the polynomials used. We also present local linear regression dis-
continuity, using optimal procedure by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012). Results presented
in Table 7 also show that Democratic governors decrease pollution levels.
Third, we run a placebo RDD, using outcomes in the previous term to remove concerns
of the persistence of results. One concern is that the decrease in concentrations found
above could result from long term trends. To remove this concern, we use concentration
data in the previous term as an outcome and run placebo RD test. We find that there is
no discontinuity in concentration outcomes in the year prior to the election (T-1), which
imparts confidence in the RDD. Results are presented in Table 10.
Fourth, results are robust to adding controls for characteristics of the election to bet-
ter isolate the impact of the gubernatorial election. Results are qualitatively the same if
we control for characteristics of governors (gender and ethnic group), and the term of the
governor. The results are also qualitatively the same if we exclude the first year a governor
is in power, to remove potential lags in policy. The Democratic Party has some conserva-
tive members whose political views are similar to their Republican counterparts, and they
are mainly found in Southern states. Consequently, we investigated the impact of party
affiliation on air pollution when Southern states are excluded from the sample. Results are
presented in Appendix Table A.1. The analysis using this subsample yields qualitatively
the same conclusion: Democrats decrease air pollution. Appendix Table A.2 presents re-
sults when governors and state legislatures are of the same party (united government); one
6We also investigate whether campaign spending by Democrats across states in close elections differs
from that by Republicans (Caughey and Sekhon (2011)). Using data from Jensen & Beyle (2003), we find
no evidence for this. Furthermore, for close elections to be regarded as fully random, the elections won by
Democratic governors should not be more likely to come with a Democratic legislature. We checked and
confirmed that those variables are not statistically different when Democrats barely won.
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might argue that party affiliation plays a more important role in such a case. Results of
Table A.2 point all to the same conclusion: Democratic governors decrease air pollution.7
These additional robustness checks provide confidence that Democratic governors have a
significant impact on air quality.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we found a significant causal impact of party allegiance on the realized
levels of air pollution for nitrogen dioxide, ground-Level Ozone and particulate matters.
Conformably to the literature, we find that the causal effect of governors are likely sourced
in the parties’ chosen policies. We contribute to the literature by showing that political
party in power have measurable impacts on the realized levels of pollutants. This is an
important issue because of the well documented link between air pollution and health.
An interesting finding is that the effect mostly happens for relatively low levels of pol-
lution, i.e. below the national standards. This suggests that national regulations, such as
the EPA standards, are effective not only in reducing pollution, but also in tempering the
political power play between Republican and Democratic governors.
7For the sake of brevity, we present RD estimates on non-Southern states and united governments.
Detailed results are available upon request.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Concentration across States and Time)
Pollutant Average Std. Dev.
CO 1.405 (1.684)
NO2 17.135 (15.480)
Ozone 0.0435 (0.008)
Particulate 24.114 (8.995)
SO2 8.045 (16.690)
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
Table 2: RD estimates: 2nd order - Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0315 -0.1359** -0.0022*** -0.0715** -0.0952
(0.0268) (0.0664) (0.0006) (0.0283) (0.0624)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
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Table 3: RD estimates: 2nd order - Exceed Concentration
(1) (2) (3)
Variables CO Ozone Particulate
Democratic Gov. -0.0064 -2.8292*** -0.0014
(0.0099) (0.8316) (0.0841)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
Table 4: RD estimates: 2nd order - Concentration and control for policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. 0.0124 -0.0092 0.0001 -0.0085 0.0388
(0.0105) (0.0312) (0.0004) (0.0163) (0.0341)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
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Table 5: RD estimates: 2nd order - Concentration and control for policies and control for
spending on parks and recreation and natural ressources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0038 0.0633
(0.0230) (0.0334) (0.0004) (0.0163) (0.0605)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA) and U.S.
Census Bureau (State Government Finances).
Table 6: RD estimates: 2nd order - Concentration and control for spending on parks and
recreation and natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0170 -0.0891 -0.0021*** -0.0643** 0.0600
(0.0258) (0.0659) (0.0007) (0.0273) (0.0623)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA) and U.S.
Census Bureau (State Government Finances).
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Table 7: Local-linear RD estimates with optimal bandwidth by IK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.1358** -0.2269*** -0.0022** -0.0664* -0.2368*
(0.0547) (0.0660) (0.0010) (0.0394) (0.1380)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
Table 8: RD estimates: 1st order - Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0057 -0.1367*** -0.0014*** -0.0394* -0.0604
(0.0211) (0.0522) (0.0005) (0.0231) (0.0479)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
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Table 9: RD estimates: 3rd order - Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0224 -0.2663*** -0.0023*** -0.1026*** -0.0952
(0.0308) (0.0762) (0.0007) (0.0366) (0.0624)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
Table 10: Placebo RD estimates: T-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0156 0.0711 -0.0003 -0.0253 0.1040
(0.0301) (0.0623) (0.0009) (0.0407) (0.0754)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
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Figure I: The Impact of Democratic Governors on Air Quality
a. Rd Graph - CO (left) and NO2 (right)
b. Rd Graph - Ozone (left) and Particulate (right)
c. Rd Graph - SO2
Sources: EEPA and Election Data
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Margin of Democratic Victory
Figure 3: McCrary test
22
Figure 4: Historic National Trends (Concentration Levels, 2013=1)
Source: EPA
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Figure 5: Historic National Trends, Sulfur Dioxide (Concentrations, ppb)
Source: EPA
Figure 6: Historic National Trends, Nitrogen Dioxide (Concentrations, ppb)
Source: EPA
24
Appendix
Table A.1: RD estimates: Non-Southern states - Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. 0.0036 -0.2883*** -0.0035*** -0.0918** -0.1837**
(0.0360) (0.0942) (0.0009) (0.0425) (0.0842)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
Table A.2: RD estimates: Governors, State Legislature same party - Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables CO NO2 Ozone Particulate SO2
Democratic Gov. -0.0480 -0.1192* -0.0023*** -0.0830** -0.1232*
(0.0304) (0.0713) (0.0007) (0.0330) (0.0689)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: State average concentrations for each year: CO2 (ppm), NO2 (ppb), Ozone (ppm), Particulate
(µg/m3), SO2 (ppb). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Source: Airdata (EPA)
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Table A.3: EPA Primary Standards versus WHO Guidelines
Pollutant EPA WHO Averaging Period Units
CO 9 10† 8 hours ppm
NO2 188 200 1 hour µg/m3
Ozone 150 100 8 hours µg/m3
Particulate 150 50 24 hours µg/m3
SO2 Not directly comparable
Notes: Authors’ conversions (for 1 ppb) for SO2 (2.62 µg/m3), NO2 (1.88 µg/m3), Ozone (2.00 µg/m3)
Sources: EPA NAAQS (available online at http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html) WHO Guidelines
(available online at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2006/WHO_SDE_PHE_OEH_06.02_eng.pdf)
† WHO Regional Office for Europe (available online at
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/123059/AQG2ndEd_5_5carbonmonoxide.PDF
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